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Documents and cif contracts
by Professor M G Bridge
Professor Bridge explores a number of questions relating to cost insurance and freight contracts, 
in particular the problems arising from the separation of rights in relation to goods from rights 
in relation to documents and what is meant by a 'conforming' contract.
I t is well-established that a cif buyer has separate rights in respect of the documents and of the goods, and that the transfer of documents from seller to buyer precedes any 
rights that the buyer may have in respect of the goods. Hence, a 
forthcoming complaint about the goods cannot be visited upon 
unoffending documents that conform to the contract. But what 
does 'conforming' mean? Does it mean that documents need 
only outwardly show that the cif seller has complied with its 
obligations? Or that the information they contain must be 
accurate? In answering these questions, a further question 
demands consideration: whether a conforming document has 
the same meaning under a cif contract as it has for a letter of 
credit contract.
THE NATURE OF CIF CONTRACTS
It is often said of cif contracts that they are documentary 
sales. A series of cases prompted by shipping losses in the Great 
War questioned whether cif contracts were sales of goods at all 
or rather sales of documents. The firm answer given was that 
they were sales of goods performed through the medium of 
documents. Earlier, the House of Lords, in the famous case of 
Couturier v Hastie (1856) HLC 673, had made the same point in 
concluding that a tender of cif documents did not, on the 
construction of the contract, activate the buyer's duty to pay 
when those documents concerned goods that had ceased to exist 
at the contract date. The contract presupposed the existence of 
those goods.
Although a sale of goods contract, the character of a cif
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contract as a documentary sale is such that the seller's physical 
duties are suspended until the documentary transfer has been 
completed. What are these duties? A cif seller never becomes 
bound to deliver the goods to the buyer or to an agent of the 
buyer. Instead, the conventional duty under the Sale of Goods Act 
1979 ('SGA') s. 27 of a seller to deliver, is commuted under the 
cif contract into duties to ship, or procure or adopt the 
shipment of, conforming goods and to transfer documents that 
give the buyer direct rights against the insurer and the carrier. 
Subject to the terms of the contract, the seller's physical duties 
lie in the description, quality and fitness of the goods shipped, 
as well as in their timely shipment. At the earliest, these 
obligations spring upon completion of the documentary 
transfer.
Between the shipment of the goods and the documentary 
transfer, modern bulk commodities contracts impose on the 
seller a duty to issue a notice of appropriation. This assures the 
buyer of forthcoming performance and defines the documents 
that the seller will later transfer to the buyer. It stitches together 
the physical and documentary parts of the seller's performance. 
This is why the seller's physical duties can accurately be said to 
be suspended until the documentary transfer has occurred.
They cannot plausibly be said to come into existence only on 
that event.
COMMERCIAL RISK
Cash on delivery of documents is a characteristic feature of cif 
sales. The consequence of the seller's physical duties being 
suspended is that the paying buyer is compelled to accept a 
commercial risk   the risk of pursuing the seller   after the 
documentary transfer, to recover the price when terminating 
the contract for a discharging physical breach by the seller. This 
risk can have insolvency dimensions. As is clear from Kwei Tek 
Chao v British Traders <SL Shippers Ltd (1954) 2 QB 459, the 
property in rejected goods revests in the seller and the buyer 
does not have a lien over them for the return of the price.
In a conventional domestic sale, the buyer does not have to 
pay for goods unseen but, under the SGA 1979 s. 34, may insist 
on first examining them. This gives the buyer some protection 
against the commercial risk borne by the cif buyer. In a cif 
contract, in order to give effect to the buyer's assumption of the 
commercial risk that arises from paying against documents, this 
pre-payment examination is excluded. The rule that a cif buyer 
first has to pay against conforming documents before pursuing 
the seller to recover the price when the goods are rejected, has 
been criticised by R M Goode in Commercial Law for its lack of 
'commercial realism' but, if the purpose of the rule is to 
persuade a buyer to think twice before exercising technical 
rights of termination, then it may not be lacking in realism at all.
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In E Qemens Horst Ltd v Biddell Brothers (1911) 1 KB 934, the 
buyers of a cif cargo of hops shipped in San Francisco declined 
to pay upon the documentary tender, insisting that they first had 
the right to examine the goods to see that they conformed to the 
contract. If the buyers' contention had been sound, the sellers 
would have had the invidious choice of taking responsibility for 
the landing and warehousing of the goods (at their own
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expense), or of surrendering the bill of lading so that the buyer 
could carry out the examination, in which case they would lose 
the security that goes with retaining the bill of lading. In both 
cases, the cif buyer's commercial risk would thereby be 
overturned, at least to the extent of any defects in the hops 
coming to light in the course of the buyers' examination. 
Consequently, the decision of the House of Lords that a cif 
buyer has no right to examine the goods before payment, has an 
air of inevitability about it.
DOCUMENTARY TENDER
A cif buyer, prevented from examining before payment, may 
still be unwilling to accept the commercial risk of pursuing the 
seller to recover the price if and when the goods prove to be 
non-conforming. May the buyer anticipate a future breach of 
contract regarding the physical condition of the goods and
refuse a tender of documents that on their face are perfectly 
regular? This point arose in Gill &_ Duffus SA v Berger &_ Co Inc 
[1984] AC 382, where the buyers declined to pay against a 
tender of shipping documents that did not include a report, 
issued by an inspection agency at the port of discharge, 
confirming that the quality of the out-turned goods matched a 
sample previously taken. By the time the case reached the House 
of Lords, the buyers had abandoned their contention that the 
sellers' documentary tender should have included this 
certificate. In Lord Diplock's words:
'[A] certificate ... as to the quality of the goods at port of discharge 
...is not, and indeed is incapable of being, included among shipping 
documents which a [cif] seller is required to tender to his buyer ...'
Although it is a fact of modern commercial life that goods 
commonly arrive at the port of discharge before the shipping 
documents can be tendered to the buyer, the cif seller should 
not have to present the bill of lading to the ship to facilitate the 
inspection of the cargo that would lead to the issue of the quality 
certificate. Furthermore, so well known is the cif seller's duty to 
tender the trio of bill of lading, insurance policy and invoice, 
that any addition to that documentary package should need to 
be spelt out in the contract. A simple reference to payment 
against documents ought not in itself to suffice.
In the House of Lords, the buyers were treated as having 
unlawfully repudiated the contract when refusing the 
documentary tender. When the sellers accepted the buyers' 
repudiation, they 'ceased to be under any contractual obligation 
to deliver (sic)' the goods. More accurately, their physical duties 
did not spring. As Lord Diplock phrased the matter, the buyers' 
right to reject the goods, if it existed at all, would:
'not become exercisable until the sellerf's] ... reservation of the right 
of disposal ...is terminated by his transferring the shipping documents 
to the buyers'.
In the event it .was settled that the buyers would never have 
acquired the right to reject the goods. This was because of the 
contractually binding character of the quality certificate wrhich 
showed due compliance by the sellers with the contract.
Nevertheless, the court considered what the position would 
have been had the buyers had a claim against the sellers for 
breach of their physical obligations. The sellers had terminated 
the contract for the buyers' repudiatory breach and were prima 
facie entitled, in the usual way, to damages representing the 
difference between the contract price and the (lower) market 
price prevailing when the sellers accepted the buyers' 
repudiation. The court nevertheless asserted that the sellers' 
damages should be discounted to the extent of any cross claim 
for breach of warranty that the buyers would have been entitled 
'to set up in diminution of the contract price'. This formulation 
of the matter does not quite go far enough. In principle, there is 
every reason to discount the sellers' damages to nominal 
proportions if the buyers would have gone on lawfully to reject 
the goods and bring an action for the recovery of the price.
DILUTION OF RISK
However the buyers' position is described, the most striking 
feature of Gill &^Dujfus is that it countenances the dilution of the 
cif buyer's commercial risk. Following the rule in British and 
Benington's Ltd v North Western Cachar Tea Co Ltd [1923] AC 48, a 
cif buyer who anticipates a future physical breach is denied the
normal right of a contracting party entitled to terminate for noo o I j
stated reason, or for the wrong stated reason, provided that 
good grounds for the termination, whether known or not, 
existed at the time that party did terminate the contract. 
Nevertheless, that buyer, if sure of his position, can take a 
calculated risk and repudiate the contract. If the seller's net 
claim is likely to be modest or even nominal, then litigation 
ought not to be a likely prospect. In substance if not in name, 
that cif buyer would be able to bring forward the consequent 
right to reject the goods and exercise it notwithstanding the 
tender of conforming documents. This undermines the 
fundamental rule asserted in Gill S^Duffus.
And yet, since the function of contract damages is to put the 
plaintiff in the position that he would have occupied if no breach 
of contract had been committed, principle demands that 
account be taken of the fact that a seller, condemned to a future 
physical breach, is in a very precarious position at the point of 
tender and triggers his own breach by the very act of 
transferring the shipping documents. The commercial integrity 
of the cif contract stops short of offending fundamental 
principles of damages assessment.
If the result is unpalatable and threatening to the 
documentary transfer, then the contract forms should be 
amended. One possibility would be for the form expressly to 
allow the seller to claim damages for non-acceptance of 
documents without an allowance being made for the buyer's 
cross claim. The danger here is that such a provision would be 
struck down as a penalty'. Alternatively, the contract could simply 
exclude any liability' in respect of physical breaches, unless and 
until the documentary transfer is duly completed. An exemption 
clause of this kind in an international sale contract would be 
subject to few controls.
NON-CONFORMING DOCUMENTS
There may be a more dangerous threat to the documentary 
character of the cif contract than that revealed in Gill St^Duffus. It 
arises out of the meaning of non-conforming documents. Weo o
can say that a non-conforming document includes, for example, 
a bill of lading that reveals a physical breach, such as a shipment 
on 1 August when the contract calls for a July shipment. But 
suppose that bill of lading recites a shipment date of 31 July 
when in tact the shipment occurred on 1 August. On its face, the 
bill of lading is a contorming document, but it states an untruth. 
Is the cif buyer bound to accept it?
It is instructive to refer to a decision of the Australian High 
Court that was treated in dismissive terms by Lord Diplock in 
Gill St^Duffus as:
'one of those submerged cases which lawyers in general have tacitly 
accepted as being a total loss, until it was dredged up in the course of 
the hearing of the instant case'.
That decision is Henry Dean S^Sons (Sydney) Pty Ltd v O'Day Pty 
Ltd (1927) 39 CLR 330, more particularly the judgments off 
Knox CJ and Higgins J. As their judgments were explained in 
Gill St^Duffus, they sanctioned the rejection of:
'conforming shipping documents if it should subsequently turn out 
that the actual goods shipped under the conforming documents did not 
in fact conform to the contract'.
This may be true of Higgins J but it is worth considering what 
Knox CJ in fact did say.
Henry Dean concerned a cif contract for the sale of 'Liverpool 
wheat sacks'. The buyers refused the sellers' draft bill of 
exchange on the ground that the goods shipped were not 
Liverpool wheat sacks. The question was whether the sellers at 
the time of tender were ready and willing to perform. This is 
more than merely a matter of unreformed New South Wales 
civil procedure; it goes to the heart of a contracting party's right 
to call upon the other to perform when the former's duty is 
precedent to or concurrent with the latter's duty. It was the view 
of Knox CJ that the buyer was bound only to take up 'proper 
shipping documents', which were documents concerning goods 
'of the description contained in the contract which have been 
shipped'. In other words, the documents were not conforming 
if they misdescribed the goods.
TIMING ERRORS
If this is a sound approach, there is no reason to confine it to 
matters of description. It could apply too in cases where the bill 
of lading falsely attests to the shipment of the goods in apparent 
good order and condition and where the bill falsely states the 
shipment date. An examination of English case law in the area of 
shipment dates shows support for Knox CJ's position.
In Proctor ^Gamble Philippine Mfg Corpn v Kurt A Becher GmbH &^Co 
(1988) 2 Ll Rep 21, the sellers conceded the buyers' right to reject 
a bill of lading wrongly showing a timelv shipment. This concession 
came at no cost since, though the bill of lading was wrongly dated, 
there had been a shipment within the contract period and the 
buyer had accepted die documents. But Kerr LJ stated in clear 
terms that the seller impliedly guarantees that the documents are 
'true in all material respects'. Similarly, in United Baltic Corpn v 
Buraett &^Newsam (1921) 8 Ll L Rep 190, Bankes LJ recognised the 
right of a buyer under a contract permitting shipment in either 
January or February, to reject a bill recording a January shipment, 
when in fact the shipment occurred in February.
At first instance in Proctor &^Gamble, however, Leggatt J stated 
that the buyers were bound to take up documents regular on 
their face. Nevertheless, he cited two exceptions: where the 
sellers had committed fraud and where there existed sufficient 
evidence that the bill of lading was wrongly dated. As for the 
latter, Knox CJ in Henry Day had been clear that a buyer could 
reject documents, even though lacking proof at the time of 
tender that they contained untrue statements. The buyer was 
entitled to take the risk of later vindication. If Lepgatt I meantCO J
that the evidence had to exist at the time of tender this will be a 
difficult test to apply at a remote subsequent date when the 
matter is being litigated or arbitrated. Yet it coincides with a 
provision in the Grain and Feed Trade Association (GAFTA) 
contracts that the:
'[djate of the BiII(s) of Lading shall be accepted as proof of the date 
of shipment in the absence of evidence to the contrary'
and the contract in Proctor &_ Gamble incorporated the terms in 
the GAFTA 100 contract (which is the leading cif standard form 
contract). It may be that Leggatt J's remarks were addressed to 
the buyers' position under the GAFTA 100 contract and not at 
common law.
Subject to contrary provision in the contract, it is submitted 
that the documents tendered by the cif seller have to be true in 
all material respects. As for what 'material respects' are, it is 
submitted that a misstatement is material if the documents 
could have been rejected had they contained the equivalent true 
statement. A bill of lading attesting to the shipment ot the goods
in good order and condition when this is in fact not the case, 
may be rejected, since a bill claused to show the true condition 
of the goods could lawfully be rejected by the buyer. Again, to 
revert to the example of the contract for the July shipment, a bill 
of lading falsely recording a 3 1 July shipment may be rejected 
because a truly dated bill of lading, showing shipment on 
1 August, could be rejected for non-conformity with the 
contract. Going further, the date of shipment itself is material in 
that a bill of lading falsely recording the shipment date can be 
rejected, even if the shipment in fact occurred within the 
shipment period.
LETTER OF CREDIT COMPLICATIONS
If this statement of the law on the meaning of 'conforming 
documents' is correct, then a coach and four has been run 
through the decision of the House of Lords in Gill S^Duffus that 
a cif buyer may not, at the time of documentary tender, invoke 
the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation and pray in aid the 
seller's future physical breach (presumably, even where the 
documents render this unavoidable) to justify the rejection of 
the shipping documents. Lord Diplock in Gill &^Duffus castigated 
as 'wrong' the dissenting judgment of Robert Goff LJ in the 
Court of Appeal that the buyer at the documentary stage could 
anticipate his future right to reject the goods themselves. But in 
Commercial Law, R M Goode subjects Lord Diplock's view, in 
turn, to stringent criticism. By alternative means stated above, 
the views of Robert Goff LJ would appear to be supportable.
Nevertheless, there is the letter of credit case of United City 
Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada (1983) 1 AC 168 
to consider. In that decision, the House of Lords ruled that a 
confirming bank was bound to accept shipping documents 
tendered pursuant to a letter of credit, notwithstanding the fact 
that the bill of lading had been falsely dated, not by the beneficiary 
of the letter of credit, but by loading brokers acting for the carrier. 
In the absence of fraud, the bank was bound to pay. There was no 
defence to the claim on the ground that the documents stated 
some material fact that was inaccurate. The bank was bound to 
pay against apparently conforming documents.
United City Merchants has been roundly condemned for a 
number of misconceptions concerning letters of credit, 
including the one above. Since the case does not lay down the 
law on sale of goods, it can, subject to one point, be disregarded 
for present purposes. At the heart of the decision lies the 
concern that 'the whole system of financing international trade 
by documentary means' should not be undermined. This is far 
from the bilateral position of seller and buyer under a cif 
contract. In commodity sales, the standard forms require cash 
against documents and do not stipulate for the opening of a 
letter of credit. But if payment by letter of credit were 
introduced in such contracts, the effect would be to vary what 
would otherwise be the position under the contract of sale. 
Apart from this one point, the position on letters of credit 
should not infiltrate the law of sale. @
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